Judicial Lobbying: The Politics of Labor Law, Constitutional Interpretation. Argentina 1935-1998

Mariano Tommasi, Matias Iaryczower and Pablo Spiller
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Matias Iaryczower: University of California at Los Angeles

No 73, Working Papers from Universidad de San Andres, Departamento de Economia

Abstract: This paper links the theory of interest groups influence over the legislature with that of congressional control over the judiciary. We develop a model in which (i) Court’s rulings can be reversed by Congress, and (ii) an Interest Group is privately informed about the realization of a variable affecting legislators’ preferences. Lobbying by the Interest Group can be informative to legislators provided equilibrium policy is responsive to the information disclosed. Since the rulings of an unconstrained court are unaffected by the state of nature, this can only happen if the Court is constrained by Congress. As a result, while the pro-interest group tendency of judicial decisions increases with the level of lobbying, lobbying falls the more divided Congress is on the relevant issues. We apply this framework to Supreme Court labor decisions in Argentina, and find results consistent with the predictions of the theory.

Keywords: judicial; lobby; labor law; constitutions; Argentina (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 44 pages
Date: 2004-06, Revised 2004-06
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https://webacademicos.udesa.edu.ar/pub/econ/doc73.pdf First version, 2004 (application/pdf)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sad:wpaper:73

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