The Effect of Corruption on Bidding Behavior in First-Price Auctions

Federico Weinschelbaum and Leandro Arozamena

No 82, Working Papers from Universidad de San Andres, Departamento de Economia

Keywords: Auctions; corruption; Right-of-first-refusal (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D44 L14 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2005-02, Revised 2005-08
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

Published in European Economic Review, Vol. 53, Issue 6, August 2005, pp. 645-657

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
Journal Article: The effect of corruption on bidding behavior in first-price auctions (2009)
Working Paper: The Effect of Corruption on Bidding Behavior in First-Price Auctions (2004)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sad:wpaper:82

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working Papers from Universidad de San Andres, Departamento de Economia Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Economia ().