The Effect of Corruption on Bidding Behavior in First-Price Auctions

Federico Weinschelbaum and Leandro Arozamena

No 82, Working Papers from Universidad de San Andres, Departamento de Economia

Keywords: Auctions; corruption; Right-of-first-refusal (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D44 L14 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2005-02, Revised 2005-08
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

Published in European Economic Review, Vol. 53, Issue 6, August 2005, pp. 645-657

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Related works:
Journal Article: The effect of corruption on bidding behavior in first-price auctions (2009)
Working Paper: The Effect of Corruption on Bidding Behavior in First-Price Auctions (2004)
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