Guilt, Inequity, and Gender in a Dictator Game

Pierpaolo Battigalli (), Giovanni Di Bartolomeo () and Stefano Papa

No 248, Working Papers in Public Economics from Department of Economics and Law, Sapienza University of Roma

Abstract: This research investigates the motivations in sharing decisions in a dictator game, trying to distinguish the role of guilt aversion from other social preferences, such as altruism and inequity aversion. Using an experimental design that incorporates exogenous variations in beliefs and endowments, we manipulate probabilities to generate scenarios with varying expected sharing costs. This approach allows for an in-depth examination of how sharing behaviors correlate with second-order beliefs across different cost conditions. Focusing on the guilt and inequity aversion channels, the study also explores how gender influences behavior.

Keywords: expectations; guilt aversion; inequity aversion; opportunity costs; gender differences (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: A13 C91 D01 D64 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 26
Date: 2024-05
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp, nep-gth and nep-upt
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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