Non-neutrality of monetary policy in policy games
Nicola Acocella and
Giovanni Di Bartolomeo ()
No 49, Working Papers from University of Rome La Sapienza, Department of Public Economics
The main aim of this article is to investigate the sources of non-neutrality in policy games involving one or more trade unions. We use a simple set up in order to clearly expose the basic mechanisms that also work in more complex frameworks. We show that there are common roots in the nonneutrality results so far obtained in apparently different contexts as, e.g., an inflation-averse union playing against the government; a union sharing some other common objective with a policy maker; or when more than one union interacts with monopolistic competitors in the goods market and a policymaker. We finally show that there are other cases where the nonneutrality result can arise.
Keywords: neutrality; money; unions; policy game. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: E00 E52 J51 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Working Paper: NON-NEUTRALITY OF MONETARY POLICY IN POLICY GAMES (2005)
Journal Article: Non-neutrality of monetary policy in policy games (2004)
Working Paper: Non-neutrality of monetary policy in policy games (2002)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sap:wpaper:wp49
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