Non-neutrality of monetary policy in policy games

Nicola Acocella () and Giovanni Di Bartolomeo ()

Macroeconomics from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: The main aim of this article is to investigate the sources of non- neutrality in policy games involving one or more trade unions. We use a simple set up in order to clearly expose the basic mechanisms that also work in more complex frameworks. We show that there are common roots in the non-neutrality results so far obtained in apparently different contexts as, e.g., an inflation-averse union playing against the government; a union sharing some other common objective with a policy maker; or when more than one union interacts with monopolistic competitors in the goods market and a policymaker. We finally show that there are other cases where the non-neutrality result can arise.

Keywords: neutrality; money; unions; policy game (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: E00 E52 J51 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2002-07-02
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cba, nep-mac and nep-mon
Note: Type of Document - pdf; prepared on IBM PC; to print on hp;
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (14)

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Related works:
Working Paper: NON-NEUTRALITY OF MONETARY POLICY IN POLICY GAMES (2005)
Journal Article: Non-neutrality of monetary policy in policy games (2004)
Working Paper: Non-neutrality of monetary policy in policy games (2002)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wpa:wuwpma:0207002

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