Core and Stable Sets of Exchange Economies with Externalities

Maria Graziano, Claudia Meo () and Nicholas C. Yannelis ()
Additional contact information
Claudia Meo: Università di Napoli Federico II
Nicholas C. Yannelis: University of Iowa

CSEF Working Papers from Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy

Abstract: It is known that the core of an economy with externalities may be empty. We consider two concepts of dominance that allow us to prove that the set formed by individually rational, Pareto optimal allocations is stable and coincides with the core that, consequently, is non-empty.

Keywords: Other-regarding Preferences; Externalities; Stable Sets; Core. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 D51 D70 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021-06-16
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-des, nep-mic and nep-ore
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https://www.csef.it/WP/wp617.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Core and stable sets of exchange economies with externalities (2023)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sef:csefwp:617

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