Core and stable sets of exchange economies with externalities

Maria Graziano, Claudia Meo () and Nicholas C. Yannelis ()
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Claudia Meo: Università di Napoli Federico II
Nicholas C. Yannelis: University of Iowa

Economic Theory Bulletin, 2023, vol. 11, issue 1, No 2, 27-44

Abstract: Abstract It is known that the core of an economy with externalities may be empty. We consider two concepts of dominance that allow us to prove that the set formed by individually rational, Pareto optimal allocations is stable and coincides with the core that, consequently, is non-empty.

Keywords: Other-regarding preferences; Externalities; Stable sets; Core (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 D51 D62 D70 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023
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Working Paper: Core and Stable Sets of Exchange Economies with Externalities (2021)
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DOI: 10.1007/s40505-022-00239-x

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