Tax Evasion and Trust

Robin Boadway, Nicolas Marceau and Steeve Mongrain

Discussion Papers from Department of Economics, Simon Fraser University

Abstract: Tax evasion is typically analyzed in a principal/agent framework,the government (principal) trying to provide agents with the incentives to pay their taxes. However, evading sales, excise or trade taxes requires the cooperation of at least two taxpayers. When individuals evade taxes, they face two potential costs. One is that tax evasion may be detected and sanctioned; the other is that their partner in crime might cheat. An increase in the sanction for tax evasion leads to a direct increase in the expected cost of a transaction in the illegal sector. However, it may also reduce the incentive to cheat. It may then be that a small increase in the sanction reduces the total cost of transacting in the illegal sector. Tax evasion may increase as a result.

Keywords: Tax Evasion; Cooperation; Sanctions (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H26 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 23 pages
Date: 2000, Revised 2000-02
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.sfu.ca/repec-econ/sfu/sfudps/dp00-05.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Tax Evasion and Trust (2000)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sfu:sfudps:dp00-05

Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from

The price is Canada/United States-$3.00(Cdn)/paper,International-$5.00/paper.

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Discussion Papers from Department of Economics, Simon Fraser University Department of Economics, Simon Fraser University, 8888 University Drive, Burnaby, BC, V5A 1S6, Canada. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Working Paper Coordinator ().