Market Segmentation, Market Integration and Tacit Collusion

C. Colonescu and Nicolas Schmitt

Discussion Papers from Department of Economics, Simon Fraser University

Abstract: This paper shows that moving from market segmentation to market integration (i.e. firms can no longer discriminate among markets) has anti-competitive effects in a repeated game setting in which a simple trigger strategy is the enforcement strategy. In particular, we show that two countries can never both experience pro-competitive gains and that two similar countries always both experience anti-competitive effects from market integration.

Keywords: INTERNATIONAL TRADE; TRADE POLICY; COMPETITION; TRADE LIBERALIZATION (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: F12 F15 L41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 21 pages
Date: 1998
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Journal Article: Market Segmentation, Market Integration, and Tacit Collusion (2003)
Working Paper: Market Segmentation, Market Integration and Tacit Collusion (1998)
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