Market Segmentation, Market Integration, and Tacit Collusion

Constantin Colonescu and Nicolas Schmitt

Review of International Economics, 2003, vol. 11, issue 1, 175-192

Abstract: Moving from market segmentation to market integration (firms cannot discriminate among markets) is shown to have often anticompetitive effects in an infinitely repeated Cournot game. In particular, market integration between two countries leads both of them to experience anticompetitive effects when product markets are similar. The same conclusion holds when trade liberalization is modeled as a decrease in bilateral trade barriers followed by moving from market segmentation to market integration. The analysis also predicts that a less efficient country (like a country in transition) enjoys pro–competitive effects from market integration.

Date: 2003
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https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-9396.00376

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Working Paper: Market Segmentation, Market Integration and Tacit Collusion (1998)
Working Paper: Market Segmentation, Market Integration and Tacit Collusion (1998)
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