The Clock-Proxy Auction: A Practical Combinatorial Auction Design
Lawrene M. Ausubel,
Peter Crampton and
Paul Milgrom ()
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Lawrene M. Ausubel: University of Maryland
Peter Crampton: University of Maryland
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Peter Cramton ()
No 03-034, Discussion Papers from Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research
We propose the clock-proxy auction as a practical means for auctioning many related items. A clock auction phase is followed by a last-and-final proxy round. The approach combines the simple and transparent price discovery of the clock auction with the efficiency of the proxy auction. Linear pricing is maintained as long as possible, but then is abandoned in the proxy round to improve efficiency and enhance seller revenues. The approach has many advantages over the simultaneous ascending auction. In particular, the clock-proxy auction has no exposure problem, eliminates incentives for demand reduction, and prevents most collusive bidding strategies.
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Working Paper: The Clock-Proxy Auction: A Practical Combinatorial Auction Design (2004)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sip:dpaper:03-034
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