Multilateral Trade Bargaining: A First Look at the GATT Bargaining Records

Kyle Bagwell, Robert Staiger and Ali Yurukoglu

No 15-028, Discussion Papers from Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research

Abstract: This paper empirically examines recently declassified data from the GATT/WTO on tariff bargaining. We document eight stylized facts about these interconnected high-stakes international negotiations. We use detailed product-level offer and counteroffer data to examine several questions about trade policy, including whether preferential tariffs were a stumbling block towards liberalization, and whether the relaxation of bilateral reciprocity to multilateral reciprocity aided liberalization. We organize the empirical analysis around a theoretical model of multi-party trade negotiations motivated by the terms-of-trade theory and respecting the institutional features of most-favored-nation status and reciprocity.

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Related works:
Journal Article: Multilateral Trade Bargaining: A First Look at the GATT Bargaining Records (2020)
Working Paper: Multilateral Trade Bargaining: A First Look at the GATT Bargaining Records (2015)
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