Multilateral Trade Bargaining: A First Look at the GATT Bargaining Records
Robert Staiger () and
No 21488, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc
This paper empirically examines recently declassified data from the GATT/WTO on tariff bargaining. We document eight stylized facts about these interconnected high-stakes international negotiations. We use detailed product-level offer and counteroffer data to examine several questions about trade policy, including whether preferential tariffs were a stumbling block towards liberalization, and whether the relaxation of bilateral reciprocity to multilateral reciprocity aided liberalization. We organize the empirical analysis around a theoretical model of multi-party trade negotiations motivated by the terms-of-trade theory and respecting the institutional features of most-favored-nation status and reciprocity.
JEL-codes: C78 D02 F13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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