Product Differentiation and Relative Performance Evaluation in an Asymmetric Duopoly
Aditi Sengupta
No 708, Departmental Working Papers from Southern Methodist University, Department of Economics
Abstract:
In a model of managerial delegation in a duopoly with asymmetric costs, I show that an increase in the intensity of market competition (product differentiation) increases the absolute weight placed on rival's profit (relative performance) in the managerial compensation scheme for both firms and also increases market concentration. The relatively efficient (larger) firm always places higher weight on rival's performance and obtains higher market share.
Keywords: Strategic Delegation; Relative Performance; Managerial Compensation; Oligopoly (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D43 L13 M21 M52 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 9 pages
Date: 2007-09
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-bec, nep-com, nep-ind and nep-mic
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Journal Article: Product Differentiation and Relative Performance Evaluation in an Asymmetric Duopoly (2016) 
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:smu:ecowpa:708
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