Product Differentiation and Relative Performance Evaluation in an Asymmetric Duopoly

Aditi Sengupta

Economics Bulletin, 2016, vol. 36, issue 2, 627-633

Abstract: In a model of managerial delegation in a duopoly with asymmetric costs, I show that an increase in the intensity of market competition (product differentiation) increases the absolute weight placed on rival's profit (relative performance) in the managerial compensation scheme for both firms and also increases market concentration. The relatively efficient (larger) firm always places higher weight on rival's performance and obtains higher market share.

Keywords: Strategic Delegation; Relative Performance; Managerial Compensation; Oligopoly. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: L1 L2 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016-04-14
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Related works:
Working Paper: Product Differentiation and Relative Performance Evaluation in an Asymmetric Duopoly (2007)
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