Uniform-price auctions for Swiss government bonds: Origin and evolution

Angelo Ranaldo and Enzo Rossi

No 2016-10, Economic Studies from Swiss National Bank

Abstract: The Swiss Treasury has used the sealed-bid, uniform-price auction format for allocating government bonds since 1980. In this study, we examine the authorities' motivation for choosing the uniform-price auction. In addition, we describe how the institutional set-up evolved over time. It includes bidding requirements, class of bidders, pre-auction information, the bidding process, the determination of the cut-off price and the release of post-auction information. Finally, we provide the details of each of the 356 auctions that were held until and including 2014.

Keywords: Government bonds; Treasury auctions; uniform-price auction (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D44 G12 G20 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 46 pages
Date: 2016
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

Downloads: (external link)
https://www.snb.ch/en/publications/research/econom ... omic_studies_2016_10 (text/html)

Related works:
Working Paper: Uniform-price Auctions for Swiss Government Bonds: Origin and Evolution (2016)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:snb:snbecs:2016-10

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Economic Studies from Swiss National Bank Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Enzo Rossi ().