Uniform-price Auctions for Swiss Government Bonds: Origin and Evolution

Angelo Ranaldo and Enzo Rossi

No 1609, Working Papers on Finance from University of St. Gallen, School of Finance

Abstract: The Swiss Treasury has used the sealed-bid, uniform-price auction format for allocating government bonds since 1980. In this study, we examine the authorities’ motivation for choosing the uniform-price auction. In addition, we describe how the institutional set-up evolved over time. It includes bidding requirements, class of bidders, pre-auction information, the bidding process, the determination of the cut-off price and the release of post-auction information. Finally, we provide the details of each of the 356 auctions that were held until and including 2014.

Keywords: Government Bonds; Treasury Auctions; Uniform-price Auction (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D44 G12 G20 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 46 pages
Date: 2016-03
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ger
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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http://ux-tauri.unisg.ch/RePEc/usg/sfwpfi/WPF-1609.pdf (application/pdf)

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Working Paper: Uniform-price auctions for Swiss government bonds: Origin and evolution (2016)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:usg:sfwpfi:2016:09

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