How Sticky Wages In Existing Jobs Can Affect Hiring

Mark Bils, Yongsung Chang and Sun-Bin Kim

Working Paper Series from Institute of Economic Research, Seoul National University

Abstract: We consider a matching model of employment with flexible wages for new hires, but sticky wages within matches. Unlike most models of sticky wages, we allow effort to respond if wages are too high or too low. In the Mortensen-Pissarides model, employment is not affected by wage stickiness in existing matches. But it is in our model. If wages of matched workers are stuck too high, firms require more effort, lowering the value of additional labor and reducing hiring. We find that effort¡¯s response can greatly increase wage inertia.

Keywords: E?ort; Employment; Sticky Wages; Wage Inertia (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: E24 E32 J22 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019-02
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-dge, nep-hrm, nep-mac and nep-ore
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Related works:
Journal Article: How Sticky Wages in Existing Jobs Can Affect Hiring (2022)
Working Paper: How Sticky Wages in Existing Jobs Can Affect Hiring (2014)
Working Paper: How Sticky Wages In Existing Jobs Can Affect Hiring (2014)
Working Paper: How Sticky Wages in Existing Jobs can affect Hiring (2013)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:snu:ioerwp:no118

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