Egalitarian Equivalence and Strategyproofness in the Queueing Problem

Youngsub Chun, Manipushpak Mitra and Suresh Mutuswami

Working Paper Series from Institute of Economic Research, Seoul National University

Abstract: We investigate the implications of egalitarian equivalence (Pazner and Schmeidler [21]) together with queue eciency and strategyproofness in the context of queueing problems. We completely characterize the class of mechanisms satisfying the three requirements. Though there is no mechanism in this class satisfying budget balance, feasible mechanisms exist. We also show that it is impossible to nd a mechanism satisfying queue eciency, egalitarian equivalence and a stronger notion of strategyproofness called weak group strategyproofness. In addition, we show that generically there is no mechanism satisfying two normative notions, egalitarian equivalence and no-envy, together.

Keywords: Queueing problem; queue efficiency; strategyproofness; egalitarian equivalence; budget balance; feasibility; weak group strategyproofness; no-envy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D63 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013-04
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Egalitarian equivalence and strategyproofness in the queueing problem (2014)
Working Paper: Egalitarian Equivalence And Strategyproofness In The Queueing Problem (2013)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:snu:ioerwp:no89

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