Egalitarian equivalence and strategyproofness in the queueing problem

Youngsub Chun, Manipushpak Mitra and Suresh Mutuswami

Economic Theory, 2014, vol. 56, issue 2, 425-442

Abstract: We investigate the implications of egalitarian equivalence (Pazner and Schmeidler in Q J Econ 92:671–687, 1978 ) together with queue efficiency and strategyproofness in the context of queueing problems. We completely characterize the class of mechanisms satisfying the three requirements. Though there is no mechanism in this class satisfying budget balance, feasible mechanisms exist and we characterize the set of all such mechanisms. We also show that it is impossible to find a mechanism satisfying queue efficiency, egalitarian equivalence, and a stronger notion of strategyproofness called weak group strategyproofness. In addition, we show that generically there is no mechanism satisfying both egalitarian equivalence and no-envy. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

Keywords: Queueing problem; Strategyproofness; Egalitarian equivalence; No-envy; C72; D63; D71; D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (23)

Downloads: (external link)
http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s00199-013-0793-8 (text/html)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

Related works:
Working Paper: Egalitarian Equivalence And Strategyproofness In The Queueing Problem (2013)
Working Paper: Egalitarian Equivalence and Strategyproofness in the Queueing Problem (2013)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:joecth:v:56:y:2014:i:2:p:425-442

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.springer. ... eory/journal/199/PS2

DOI: 10.1007/s00199-013-0793-8

Access Statistics for this article

Economic Theory is currently edited by Nichoals Yanneils

More articles in Economic Theory from Springer, Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET) Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().