Do Firms Share their Profits Equally with Women and Men? The Role of Human Capital, Managerial Positions and Unions

Kevin André Pineda-Hernández, Francois Rycx, Mélanie Volral and Alexandre Waroquier

No 26-002, Working Papers CEB from ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles

Abstract: While rent-sharing is known to vary according to worker characteristics, the impact of profits on the gender wage gap warrants closer examination. Most studies adopt a single-gender view, neglecting factors tied to bargaining power. Our paper aims to fill this gap by leveraging rich matched employer-employee data covering the Belgian private sector from 1999 to 2016 and by examining whether the relationship between rent-sharing and gender depends on variables reflecting bargaining power, i.e. level of education, field of study, tenure, occupation and type of wage agreement. Accounting for a wide range of individual, job and firm characteristics, and addressing potential endogeneity issues, we find a wage-profit elasticity of 2.8%, which does not differ statistically between women and men. Our results further indicate that firms share more of their profits with workers who have greater bargaining power, as assessed by our moderators. This result holds overall for both women and men, so that the price effect associated with rent-sharing is generally insignificant in explaining the gender wage gap. Conversely, given that women, regardless of their bargaining power, tend to be employed in less profitable firms than their male counterparts, the quantity effect associated with rent-sharing appears to play a non-negligible role. In short, our findings suggest that it is not so much the unequal sharing of profits within companies that fuels the gender pay gap, but rather the segregation of women, particularly those with limited bargaining power, into less profitable companies.

Keywords: Rent-sharing; linked employer-employee data; wage decompositions; instrumental variables; gender wage gap; bargaining power (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C26 J16 J24 J31 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2026-01-29
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