TWO FOLK MANIPULABILITY THEOREMS IN THE GENERAL ONE-TO-TWO-SIDED MATCHING MARKETS WITH MONEY

David Perez-Castrillo and Marilda Sotomayor ()

No 2013_01, Working Papers, Department of Economics from University of São Paulo (FEA-USP)

Abstract: We prove a “General Manipulability Theorem” for general one-to-one two-sided matching markets with money. This theorem implies two folk theorems, the Manipulability Theorem and the General Impossibility Theorem, and provides a sort of converse of the Non-Manipulability Theorem (Demange, 1982, Leonard, 1983, Demange and Gale, 1985).

Keywords: Matching; competitive equilibrium; optimal competitive equilibrium; manipulability; competitive equilibrium mechanism; competitive equilibrium rule (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C78 D78 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013-02-18
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth
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