Commercial platforms with heterogeneous participants

Gabriel Garber and Marcio Nakane

No 2016_02, Working Papers, Department of Economics from University of São Paulo (FEA-USP)

Abstract: We study two-sided markets where there are buyers and sellers, with heterogeneous participants on each side. Buyers care about the quality of the good purchased, but sellers care only about the price they get. When there is informational asymmetry about types between the sides, the role of a platform as a certifier that guarantees a minimum quality becomes central to the transactions. We analyze first-best (perfect information) and pooling equilibria without platforms and a monopolist platform that coexists with an external pooling. We also show there is no equilibrium in a simultaneous game with two platforms.

Keywords: Platforms; two-sided markets; heterogeneous agents; certification. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D42 D43 D47 D82 D85 L12 L13 L15 L81 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016-01-29
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-cta, nep-mic, nep-mkt and nep-net
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Related works:
Working Paper: Commercial Platforms With Heterogeneous Participants (2016)
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