Undue charges and price discrimination

Gabriel Garber and Marcio Nakane

No 2016_27, Working Papers, Department of Economics from University of São Paulo (FEA-USP)

Abstract: In this paper, we draw attention to a type of price discrimination that seems to be widespread, but has gone unnoticed by the literature: one based on false mistakes and the heterogeneous cost of complaining. We focus on the example case of a bank manager that charges an undue fee from a client’s balance, and setup a model of price discrimination. We also devise a test for the detection of such behavior in a setting where the authorities have less information about the clients than the bank manager.

Keywords: Complaint; price discrimination; price discrimination test (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C10 C12 C70 D18 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016-11-24
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-mic
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Related works:
Working Paper: Undue Charges and Price Discrimination (2016)
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