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Evidence Reading Mechanisms

Frederic Koessler and Eduardo Perez

Sciences Po publications from Sciences Po

Abstract: In an environment with privately informed agents who can produce evidence, we study implementation of a social choice function by reading mechanisms: mechanisms that simply apply the social choice function to a consistent interpretation of the evidence. We provide sufficient conditions on the social choice function and the evidence structure for ex post implementability by such mechanisms. If the first-best policy of a mechanism designer satisfies this condition, then its implementation by a reading mechanism does not require commitment. We show that with rich evidence structures, (1) a function that is implementable with transfers is also implementable with evidence but no transfer, (2) under private value, the efficient allocation is implementable with budget balanced and individually rational transfers, and (3) in single-object auction and bilateral trade environments with interdependent values, the efficient allocation is implementable with budget balanced and individually rational transfers.

Keywords: Implementation; Mechanism Design; Evidence; Hard Information; Commitment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019-10
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-des and nep-mic
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

Published in Social choice and welfare, 2019, vol. 53, pp.375-397

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Working Paper: Evidence Reading Mechanisms (2019) Downloads
Working Paper: Evidence Reading Mechanisms (2019) Downloads
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