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Illegal Waste Disposal, Territorial Enforcement and Policy. Evidence from regional data

Alessio D'Amato (), Massimiliano Mazzanti, Francesco Nicolli and Mariangela Zoli

No 314, SEEDS Working Papers from SEEDS, Sustainability Environmental Economics and Dynamics Studies

Abstract: This paper investigates if and how illegal disposal of waste is affected by the decentralized waste management commitment of local governments and by enforcement policies. On the basis of a panel dataset at the Italian provincial level that originally integrates waste, economic, policy and enforcement data, our empirical analysis presents two main insights. First, a more diffuse commitment towards incentive based waste policy tends to increase illegal disposal. Second, a non-linear bell shaped relationship exists between enforcement and illegal disposal, namely deterrence only results after a (relatively high) level of controls is implemented.

Keywords: waste management; illegal disposal; forestry corps; enforcement; regional settings; waste tariffs; ecological-economic data. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D73 K42 Q53 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 19 pages
Date: 2014-01, Revised 2014-02
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-env, nep-law and nep-sog
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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http://www.sustainability-seeds.org/papers/RePec/srt/wpaper/0314.pdf First version, 2014 (application/pdf)
http://www.sustainability-seeds.org/papers/RePec/srt/wpaper/0314.pdf Revised version, 2014 (application/pdf)

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