Endogenous Networks in Random Population Games

Giorgio Fagiolo (), Luigi Marengo () and Marco Valente

LEM Papers Series from Laboratory of Economics and Management (LEM), Sant'Anna School of Advanced Studies, Pisa, Italy

Abstract: Population learning in dynamic economies has been traditionally studied in over-simplified settings where payoff landscapes are very smooth. Indeed, in these models, all agents play the same bilateral stage-game against any opponent and stage-game payoffs reflect very simple strategic situations (e.g. coordination). In this paper, we address a preliminary investigation of dynamic population games over `rugged' landscapes, where agents face a strong uncertainty about expected payoffs from bilateral interactions. We propose a simple model where individual payoffs from playing a binary action against everyone else are distributed as a i.i.d. U[0,1] r.v.. We call this setting a `random population game' and we study population adaptation over time when agents can update both actions and partners using deterministic, myopic, best reply rules. We assume that agents evaluate payoffs associated to networks where an agent is not linked with everyone else by using simple rules (i.e. statistics) computed on the distributions of payoffs associated to all possible action combinations performed by agents outside the interaction set. We investigate the long-run properties of the system by means of computer simulations. We show that: (i) allowing for endogenous networks implies higher average payoff as compared to "frozen" networks; (ii) the statistics employed to evaluate payoffs strongly affect the efficiency of the system, i.e. convergence to a unique (multiple) steady-state(s) or not; (iii) for some class of statistics (e.g. MIN or MAX), the likelihood of efficient population learning strongly depends on whether agents are change-averse or not in discriminating between options delivering the same expected payoff.

Keywords: Dynamic Population Games; Bounded Rationality; Endogenous Networks; Fitness Landscapes; Evolutionary Environments; Adaptive Expectations. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2003-12-05
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe and nep-gth
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Related works:
Journal Article: ENDOGENOUS NETWORKS IN RANDOM POPULATION GAMES (2004)
Working Paper: Endogenous Networks in Random Population Games (2003)
Working Paper: Endogenous Networks in Random Population Games
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ssa:lemwps:2003/03

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