Incentive Regulation: Evidence From German Electricity Networks
Dominik Schober and
Luis Cabral ()
Working Papers from New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business, Department of Economics
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-ene and nep-reg
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Working Paper: Incentive regulation: Evidence from German electricity networks (2019)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ste:nystbu:18-03
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