Collusion via Signalling in Open Ascending Auctions with Multiple Objects and Complementarities

Sandro Brusco and Giuseppe (Pino) Lopomo

Working Papers from New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business, Department of Economics

Date: 1999
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (21)

Downloads: (external link)
http://w4.stern.nyu.edu/economics/docs/workingpapers/1999/99-05Lopomo.pdf (application/pdf)
Our link check indicates that this URL is bad, the error code is: 404 Not Found (http://w4.stern.nyu.edu/economics/docs/workingpapers/1999/99-05Lopomo.pdf [302 Moved Temporarily]--> https://w4.stern.nyu.edu/economics/docs/workingpapers/1999/99-05Lopomo.pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Collusion via signaling in open ascending auctions with multiple objects and complementarities (1999)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ste:nystbu:99-05

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working Papers from New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business, Department of Economics New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business, Department of Economics, 44 West 4th Street, New York, NY 10012-1126. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Amanda Murphy ().