Reconsidering The Pros and Cons of Fiscal Policy Co-ordination in a Monetary Union: Should We Set Public Expenditure Targets ?

Marco Catenaro () and Patrizio Tirelli

School of Economics Discussion Papers from School of Economics, University of Surrey

Abstract: We reconsider the merits of fiscal policy co-ordination in a monetary union distinguishing between and inflation targeting regime and delegation to a weight conservative central bank. We argue that a contractualist approach a la Walsh should be extended to the conduct of fiscal policy, setting explicit public expenditure targets.

Keywords: EMU; Fiscal Leadership; ECB; Fiscal Co-ordination; Inflation Targets (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: E52 E58 E61 E62 F42 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2000-02
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-eec, nep-his, nep-pbe and nep-pub
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (25)

Downloads: (external link)
https://repec.som.surrey.ac.uk/archive/surrec0002.pdf (application/pdf)
Our link check indicates that this URL is bad, the error code is: 404 Not Found

Related works:
Working Paper: Reconsidering The Pros and Cons of Fiscal Policy Coordination in a Monetary Union: Should We Set Public Expenditure Targets? (2000)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sur:surrec:0002

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in School of Economics Discussion Papers from School of Economics, University of Surrey Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Ioannis Lazopoulos ().