Costly Network Formation and Regular Equilibria

Francesco De Sinopoli and Carlos Pimienta (c.pimienta@unsw.edu.au)

No 2009-05, Discussion Papers from School of Economics, The University of New South Wales

Abstract: We prove that for generic network-formation games where players incur some strictly positive cost to propose links the number of Nash equilibria is finite. Furthermore all Nash equilibria are regular and, therefore, stable sets.

Keywords: Network-formation games; Regular equilibrium; Stable sets (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C62 C72 D85 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 9 pages
Date: 2009-06
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth and nep-net
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Journal Article: Costly network formation and regular equilibria (2010)
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