Timing Information Flows

Gabriele Gratton, Richard Holden and Anton Kolotilin

No 2015-16, Discussion Papers from School of Economics, The University of New South Wales

Abstract: At an exogenous deadline, Receiver must take an action, the payoff of which depends on Sender’s private binary type. Sender privately observes whether and when an opportunity to start a public flow of information about her type arrives. She then chooses when to seize this opportunity. Starting the information flow earlier exposes to greater scrutiny but signals credibility. We characterize the set of equilibria and show that Sender always delays the information flow and completely withholds it with strictly positive probability. Focusing on the stable equilibrium, we derive comparative statics, and discuss implications for organizations, politics, and financial markets.

Keywords: information disclosure; strategic timing; Bayesian learning; credibility vs. scrutiny (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 D82 D83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 9 pages
Date: 2015-07
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-mic
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