Strong Boards and Risk-taking in Islamic Banks
Sabur Mollah (),
Michael Skully and
Eva Liljeblom ()
No 2018-08, Working Papers from Swansea University, School of Management
This paper examines whether variations in strong boards explain the differences between risk-taking in Islamic and conventional banks. From an analysis of a pooled sample of Islamic and conventional banks, we find that strong boards in general serve their shareholders through engaging in higher risk-taking activities across both types of banks. In Islamic banks, however, the Shari'ah Supervisory Board (SSB) is found to mitigate risk-taking when integrated with a strong board, as religiosity restrains risk-taking.
Keywords: Strong Board; SSB; Religiosity; Risk-Taking; Islamic Banks; and Conventional Banks. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G01 G21 G34 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 46 pages
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-isf and nep-rmg
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:swn:wpaper:2018-08
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