The Impact of Resale on Entry in Second Price Auctions
XiaoGang Che (),
Peter Lee and
Yibai Yang ()
No 2013-07, Working Papers from University of Sydney, School of Economics
This paper investigates the effect of resale allowance on entry strategies in a second price auction with two bidders whose entries are sequential and costly. We first characterize the perfect Bayesian equilibrium in cutoff strategies. We then show that there exists a unique threshold such that if the reseller's bargaining power is greater (less) than the threshold, resale allowance causes the leading bidder (the following bidder) to have a higher (lower) incentive on entry; i.e., the cutoff of entry becomes lower (higher). We also discuss asymmetric bidders and the original seller's expected revenue.
Keywords: resale; sequential entry; costly participation; Second price auctions (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Journal Article: The impact of resale on entry in second price auctions (2013)
Working Paper: The Impact of Resale on Entry in Second Price Auctions (2013)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:syd:wpaper:2123/9029
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