The role of reporting institutions and image motivation in tax evasion and incidence
Topi Miettinen and
No 2133, Working Papers from Tampere University, Faculty of Management and Business, Economics
We investigate effects of tax reporting mechanisms on evasion and incidence in experimental double auction markets where counterfactual reporting and market outcomes can be studied after convergence. There are two control conditions: (i) markets without taxes and (ii) markets where taxes are automatically levied. These are compared to (iii) markets with seller-reporting only and fines paid if low-probability audit discovers evasion, to (iv) markets with both seller- and buyer-reporting and a higher audit probability due to any gap in the numbers reported by the seller and her customers, and to (v) markets where, in addition, buyer-reporting is costly. The latter two mimic varying reporting incentives in the so called third-party reporting in tax enforcement. We find that 20% of the sellers are truthful when only sellers report, but that 80% and 66% of them are truthful under costless and costly third-party reporting, respectively. Pricing, incidence, and reporting patterns in all treatments can be explained by a model of lying costs with image concerns based on Gneezy et al. (2018).
JEL-codes: D40 D44 D91 H21 H22 H26 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 71 pages
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-acc, nep-exp, nep-his, nep-iue and nep-pbe
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http://urn.fi/URN:ISBN:978-952-03-2034-8 First version, 2021 (application/pdf)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:tam:wpaper:2133
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