(A)symmetric Information Bubbles: Experimental Evidence

Yasushi Asako (), Yukihiko Funaki (), Kozo Ueda and Nobuyuki Uto

No e133, Working Papers from Tokyo Center for Economic Research

Abstract: Asymmetric information has explained the existence of a bubble in extant theoretical models. This study experimentally analyzes traders' choices, with and without asymmetric information, based on the riding-bubble model. We show that traders tend to hold a bubble asset for longer, thereby expanding the bubble in a market with symmetric, rather than asymmetric, information. However, when traders are more experienced, the size of the bubble decreases, in which case, bubbles do not arise with symmetric information. In contrast, the size of the bubble is stable in a market with asymmetric information.

Pages: 54 pages
Date: 2019-05
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://www.tcer.or.jp/wp/pdf/e133.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: (A)symmetric information bubbles: Experimental evidence (2020)
Working Paper: Symmetric information bubbles: Experimental evidence (2017)
Working Paper: (A)symmetric Information Bubbles: Experimental Evidence (2017)
Working Paper: Symmetric Information Bubbles: Experimental Evidence (2016)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:tcr:wpaper:e133

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working Papers from Tokyo Center for Economic Research Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by ().