(A)symmetric Information Bubbles: Experimental Evidence
Yasushi Asako (),
Yukihiko Funaki (),
Kozo Ueda and
No e133, Working Papers from Tokyo Center for Economic Research
Asymmetric information has explained the existence of a bubble in extant theoretical models. This study experimentally analyzes traders' choices, with and without asymmetric information, based on the riding-bubble model. We show that traders tend to hold a bubble asset for longer, thereby expanding the bubble in a market with symmetric, rather than asymmetric, information. However, when traders are more experienced, the size of the bubble decreases, in which case, bubbles do not arise with symmetric information. In contrast, the size of the bubble is stable in a market with asymmetric information.
Pages: 54 pages
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Journal Article: (A)symmetric information bubbles: Experimental evidence (2020)
Working Paper: Symmetric information bubbles: Experimental evidence (2017)
Working Paper: (A)symmetric Information Bubbles: Experimental Evidence (2017)
Working Paper: Symmetric Information Bubbles: Experimental Evidence (2016)
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