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Statistical Inference in Evolutionary Dynamics

Ryoji Sawa

No e170, Working Papers from Tokyo Center for Economic Research

Abstract: We introduce evolutionary dynamics for two-action games where agents with diverse preferences use statistical inference to guide their behavior. We show that the dynamic converges to a Bayesian sampling equilibrium with statistical inference (SESI) and the set of Bayesian SESIs is globally asymptotically stable. We discuss the global convergence to a unique Bayesian SESI in anti-coordination games, a welfare-improving tax scheme, equilibrium selection in coordination games, an application to the diffusion of behavior on networks, and the extension of heterogeneity to the inference procedures.

Pages: 37 pages
Date: 2022-03
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-evo and nep-gth
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