Ambiguity, Social Opinion and the Use of Common Property Resources
Dimitrios Diamantaras () and
Robert Gilles ()
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Robert Gilles: Management School, Queen's University
No 1006, DETU Working Papers from Department of Economics, Temple University
In this paper we argue that ambiguity, combined with social opinion formation can be represented as part of a game-theoretic equilibrium concept that transcends the standard Nash equilibrium concept, applied to a model of the tragedy of the commons. Our modeling can shed some light on the international environment crisis and the relevant ongoing international negotiations. We conclude that social opinion formation in most cases has a significant impact on equilibrium common property resource usage.
Keywords: Externalities; environment; ambiguity; ambiguity equilibrium (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D62 D81 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-env, nep-gth and nep-net
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http://www.cla.temple.edu/RePEc/documents/detu_10_06.pdf First version, 2010 (application/pdf)
Journal Article: Ambiguity, social opinion and the use of common property resources (2011)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:tem:wpaper:1006
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