Imitation of Cooperation in Prisoner's Dilemma Games with Some Local Interaction

Maarten C.W. Janssen ()
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Maarten C.W. Janssen: Erasmus University Rotterdam

No 00-019/1, Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers from Tinbergen Institute

Abstract: In this paper I study conditions for the emergence of cooperativebehavior in a dynamic model of population interaction.The model has finitely many individuals located on a circle. The pay-off of each individual is partly based on the (local)interaction with neighbors and partly on (uniform) interaction withthe whole population. The dynamics is driven byimitative behavior. I show that for a large class of parameterscooperation will emerge if the population is large; if thepopulation is small, defection will prevail in the long run. Theresult contrasts with conventional wisdom which says that thelarger the population, the less likely cooperation will be.

Keywords: Cooperation; Prisoner's Dilemma; Evolutionary Game Theory; Local Interaction (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D62 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2000-03-22
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:tin:wpaper:20000019

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