Competitive Bidding in Auctions with Private and Common Values

Jacob Goeree and Theo Offerman ()
Additional contact information
Theo Offerman: CREED, University of Amsterdam

No 00-044/1, Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers from Tinbergen Institute

Abstract: See the article with the same title in the 'Economic Journal' (2003), 113, 598-614.

The objects for sale in most auctions possess both private and common value elements. This salient feature has not yet been incorporated into a strategic analysis of equilibrium bidding behaviour. This paper reports such an analysis for a stylised model in which bidders receive a private value signal and an independent common value signal. We show that more uncertainty about the common value has a negative effect on efficiency. Information provided by the seller decreases uncertainty, which raises efficiency and seller's revenues. Efficiency and revenues are also higher when more bidders enter the auction.

This discussion paper has resulted in a publication in The Economic Journal , 2003, 113(489), 598-613.

Keywords: Auctions; inefficiencies; information disclosure; competition (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D44 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2000-06-06
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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https://papers.tinbergen.nl/00044.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Competitive Bidding in Auctions with Private and Common Values (2003)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:tin:wpaper:20000044

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