The Pre-commitment Advantage of Having a Slow Legislative System
Paul Frijters () and
No 01-008/3, Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers from Tinbergen Institute
In this paper it is argued that the slowness of the legislativesystem implies pre-commitment of legislation for at least the periodit takes to change a law. A simple model illustrates the benefit ofthis pre-commitment.
Keywords: time-inconsistency; legislation; irreversible investments (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D70 E61 F41 K40 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:tin:wpaper:20010008
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