Altruism, Fairness and Evolution: the Case for Repeated Stochastic Games

Matthijs van Veelen

No 02-111/1, Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers from Tinbergen Institute

Abstract: This paper is an effort to convince the reader that using a stochastic stage game in a repeated setting - rather than a deterministic one - comes with many advantages. The first is that as a game it is more realistic to assume that payoffs in future games are uncertain. The second is that it allows for strategies that make an evolutionary approach possible, while folk theorem strategies do not allow for such an analysis. But the most important feature is that such a setting allows for equilibrium strategies that look very much like human behaviour; altruism and fairness will be shown to feature in a natural way in equilibrium.

JEL-codes: C70 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2002-10-30
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://papers.tinbergen.nl/02111.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:tin:wpaper:20020111

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers from Tinbergen Institute Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Tinbergen Office +31 (0)10-4088900 ().