Cartel Stability with Subjective Detection Beliefs

Jeroen Hinloopen

No 03-008/2, Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers from Tinbergen Institute

Abstract: The condition is derived for Friedman 's trigger strategy to sustaina collusive market equilibrium as a noncooperative Nash equilibriumgiven subjective beliefs as to the antitrust authority's ability of suc-cesfully dissolving the illegal cartel.

Keywords: Cartel stability; trigger strategy; subjective beliefs. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: L12 L41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2003-01-23
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