Do Elections lead to Informed Public Decisions?

Otto Swank () and Bauke Visser

No 03-067/1, Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers from Tinbergen Institute

Abstract: This discussion paper led to a publication in 'Public Choice', 129, 435-460.

Democracies delegate substantial decision power to politicians. Using a model in which an incumbent can design, examine and implement public policies, we show that examination takes place in spite of, rather than thanks to, elections. Elections are needed as a carrot and a stick to motivate politicians, yet politicians who are overly interested in re-election shy away from policy examination. Our analysis sheds light on the distance created in mature democracies between the political process and the production of policy relevant information; on the role played by probing into candidates' past; and on the possibility of crowding out desirable political behaviour by increasing the value of holding office.

Keywords: Democracy; Media; Policy Examination; Multiple Tasks; Information; Elections (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 D78 D83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2003-08-27
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Do elections lead to informed public decisions? (2006)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:tin:wpaper:20030067

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