On Finding Curb Sets in Extensive Games

Vitaly Pruzhansky ()
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Vitaly Pruzhansky: Faculty of Economics and Business Administration, Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam

No 03-098/1, Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers from Tinbergen Institute

Abstract: We characterize strategy sets that are closed under rational behavior (curb) in extensive games of perfect information and finite horizon. It is shown that any such game possesses only one minimal curb set, which necessarily includes all its subgame perfect Nash equilibria. Applications of this result are twofold. First, it lessens computational burden while computing minimal curb sets. Second, it implies that the profile of subgame perfect equilibrium strategies is always stochastically stable in a certain class of games.

Keywords: rationalizability; stochastic stability (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2003-12-08
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:tin:wpaper:20030098

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