A Discussion of Maximin

Vitaly Pruzhansky ()
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Vitaly Pruzhansky: Faculty of Economics and Business Administration, Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam

No 04-028/1, Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers from Tinbergen Institute

Abstract: This paper builds on one of the results of Pruzhansky [22], namely that maximin strategies guarantee the same expected payoffs as mixed Nash equilibrium strategies in bimatrix games. We present a discussion on the applicability of maximin strategies in such class of games. The usefulness of maximin is illustrated from both positive and normative viewpoints. Examples are provided.

Keywords: Bounded rationality; common knowledge of rationality; correlated equilibria; rationalizability; uncertainty aversion (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2004-03-02
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:tin:wpaper:20040028

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