EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

Polarization, Information Collection and Electoral Control

Silvia Dominguez-Martinez () and Otto Swank ()

No 04-035/1, Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers from Tinbergen Institute

Abstract: This discussion paper led to a publication in 'Social Choice and Welfare', 2006, 26, 527-545.

We identify the conditions under which voters can induce political parties to collect information and to select policies which are optimal from the representative voter’s point of view. We show that when parties are office motivated the voting rule should encourage parties to collect information. Voting rules that focus on the opposition party sometimes dominate voting rules that focus on the incumbent party. When parties are policy motivated, they also have to be motivated to select good policies. Generally, it is easier to stimulate policy motivated parties than office motivated parties to collect information. However, in contrast to office motivated parties, policy motivated parties will sometimes select policies that conflict with the representative voter’s interest.

This discussion paper has resulted in a publication in the 'Social Choice and Welfare' . (26(3), 527-45.)

Keywords: political competition; information; polarization. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2004-03-25
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://papers.tinbergen.nl/04035.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Polarization, Information Collection and Electoral Control (2006) Downloads
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:tin:wpaper:20040035

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers from Tinbergen Institute Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Tinbergen Office +31 (0)10-4088900 ().

 
Page updated 2025-04-01
Handle: RePEc:tin:wpaper:20040035