Strategic Wage Setting and Coordination Frictions with Multiple Applications

Pieter Gautier and Jose L. Moraga ()
Additional contact information
Jose L. Moraga: University of Groningen

No 04-063/1, Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers from Tinbergen Institute

Abstract: We examine wage competition in a model where identical workers choose the number of jobs to apply for and identical firms simultaneously post a wage. The Nash equilibrium of this game exhibits the following properties: (i) an equilibrium where workers apply for just one job exhibits unemployment and absence of wage dispersion; (ii) an equilibrium where workers apply for two or for more (but not for all) jobs always exhibits wage dispersion and, typically, unemployment; (iii) the equilibrium wage distribution with a higher vacancy-to-unemployment ratio first-order stochastically dominates the wage distribution with a lower level of labor market tightness; (iv) the average wage is non-monotonic in the number of applications; (v) the equilibrium number of applications is non-monotonic in the vacancy-to-unemployment ratio; (vi) a minimum wage increase can be welfare improving because it compresses the wage distribution and reduces the congestion effects cause! d by the socially excessive number of applications; and (vii) the only way to obtain efficiency is to impose a mandatory wage that eliminates wage dispersion altogether.

Keywords: search; wage setting; coordination frictions; wage dispersion (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D62 D83 J23 J41 J64 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2004-06-01, Revised 2004-08-16
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Strategic Wage Setting and Coordination Frictions with Multiple Applications (2004)
Working Paper: Strategic Wage Setting and Coordination Frictions with Multiple Applications (2004)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:tin:wpaper:20040063

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