Information Overload in Multi-Stage Selection Procedures

Stefano Ficco () and Vladimir Karamychev
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Stefano Ficco: Faculty of Economics, Erasmus Universiteit Rotterdam

No 04-077/1, Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers from Tinbergen Institute

Abstract: The paper studies information processing imperfections in a fully rational decision-making network. It is shown that imperfect information transmission and imperfect information acquisition in a multi-stage selection game yield information overload. The paper analyses the mechanisms responsible for a seeming bounded rational behavior of the network and shows their similarities and distinctions. Two special cases of filtering selection procedures are investigated, where the overload takes its most limiting forms. The model developed in the paper can be applied both to organizations and to individuals. It can serve as a rational foundation for bounded rationality.

Keywords: Screening; Multistage Selection; Information Overload; Bounded Rationality (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D70 D80 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2004-07-09
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:tin:wpaper:20040077

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