The Pro-collusive Effect of Increasing the Repose Period for Price Fixing Agreements

Jeroen Hinloopen

No 05-104/1, Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers from Tinbergen Institute

Abstract: This discussion paper resulted in the publication The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy (2007), 7(1), 1135.

Intuitively, extending the period of repose for price fixing agreements enhances the effectiveness of competition policy enforcement. This paper proofs this intuition wrong. As extending the repose period reduces cartel members' defection payoff while it leaves unaltered expected compliance profits, it induces cartels to be more stable internally.

Keywords: Cartel stability; detection probabilities; statue of limitation. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: K21 K42 L12 L41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2005-11-14
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Journal Article: The Pro-collusive Effect of Increasing the Repose Period for Price Fixing Agreements (2007)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:tin:wpaper:20050104

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